We propose a simple model in which the expected returns in emerging markets depend on their systematic risk as measured by their beta relative to the world portfolio as well as on the level of integration in the world market. The level of integration is a time-varying variable that depends on the market value of the assets that can be held by domestic investors only versus the market value of the assets that can be traded freely.
Introduction
An important issue in international …nance is the e¤ect of market segmentation on expected returns. Asset pricing models such as the International CAPM assume that markets are completely integrated, implying that expected returns depend on the covariance with the return on the world market portfolio and possibly with currency deposit returns (see, e.g., Adler and Dumas (1983) ). If markets are (partially) segmented, then the International CAPM no longer applies, and other factors enter the pricing relation as well (see, e.g., Errunza and Losq (1985) ).
It is generally believed that as markets become more integrated, the cost of capital decreases because the removal of investment barriers allows for improved risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents (see, e.g., Stulz (1999) ). In a recent paper, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) study the e¤ect of capital market liberalizations, i.e., a country's decision to open up the equity market, allowing the market to become more integrated with the rest of the world. Bekaert and Harvey …nd that the cost of capital decreases by 5 to 75 basis points after a capital market liberalization. Similarly, Henry (2000) analyzes the announcement e¤ects of emerging market liberalizations, and …nds that a country's equity price index shows an abnormal return of 3.3 percent per month during an eight-month period, implying a total price increase of about 25 percent. Based on stock returns for 126 …rms in 32 countries, Errunza and Miller (2000) report a reduction in the cost of capital of 11.3 percentage points following ADR introductions. Thus, there appears to be strong evidence that market liberalizations lead to lower expected returns in emerging markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) show that market liberalizations spur economic growth in a country, and that this e¤ect is mainly due to the decrease in the cost of capital that follows liberalizations. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Stulz (1999) stress the fact that the degree to which markets are integrated or segmented is not …xed, but changes gradually over time and that liberalizations are not one-shot events. Bekaert and Harvey (1995) estimate the degree of integration for 21 developed markets and 12 emerging markets and show that, indeed, market integration varies over time. Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2001) document the timevariation in the level of integration for seven emerging markets. They …nd that there is a lot of cross-sectional variation in the level of integration and a strong increase in integration over time. However, these paper do not relate market integration to expected returns. In contrast, the recent papers by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , Henry (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine (2002) treat integration as a one-shot event, using o¢cial liberalization dates or estimated dates.
In this paper we argue that time variation in the integration level is important, and should be taken into account when estimating the e¤ects of liberalization on the cost of capital in emerging markets. We introduce a new measure of market segmentation, the fraction of assets in an economy that cannot be traded by foreign investors. This measure follows from a simple asset pricing model, similar in spirit to the model of Errunza and Losq (1985) , in which expected returns depend on the level of market segmentation, as measured by the fraction of assets in a market that cannot be traded by foreign investors. Our model is similar to the well known CAPM with nontradable assets as in Mayers (1976) and to the hedging pressure models that are used to explain expected returns in futures markets, as proposed by Hirshleifer (1988) , and DeRoon, Nijman, and Veld (2000) for instance. The assets that cannot be traded by foreign investors, which we use as our segmentation variable, has to be held by domestic investors only, thereby causing an additional premium in tradable assets similar to hedging pressure e¤ects in futures markets. Since the level of segmentation changes over time, expected returns should be time-varying as well.
For a set of 30 emerging markets, we show the e¤ect of market segmentation on expected returns for the freely tradable, or investable, assets to be signi…cant, both statistically and economically. In our model we also derive the implications of segmentation for the expected returns on the noninvestable indices. Consistent with the model, we …nd that the expected returns on nontraded, or noninvestable, assets in a country are also a¤ected by the level of segmentation, although these results are generally weaker than for the investable assets.
As markets open up and become more integrated with the rest of the world, one may expect that the beta of a country relative to the world portfolio increases. Allowing for time-varying betas that are linear in the segmentation variables, we …nd even stronger segmentation e¤ects on expected returns. The direct e¤ect of segmentation on expected returns and the e¤ect on beta usually have the opposite sign: whereas the direct e¤ect of a decrease in segmentation leads to lower expected returns, it is accompanied by an increase in beta, implying higher expected returns. For the composite index of all the emerging markets, the annual increase in beta due to the increases in market integration during our sample period is about 0.09. This is similar in magnitude to the change in beta reported by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) .
Our simple model also implies that trading restrictions in one market can a¤ect the expected returns in other markets if the correlation between these markets is su¢ciently high. Such cross-e¤ects of segmentation across countries have not been analyzed before. Our empirical results show that within a geographic region there are indeed such cross e¤ects from trading restrictions in one country on the expected returns in other countries. Using panel data regressions, we estimate that for the individual countries on average the changes in the local and regional level of segmentation together induce a decrease in expected returns of 3.7 percent per annum. We also …nd that on average approximately 63% of this decrease is due to the change in the local segmentation variable and 37% is due to the change in the regional segmentation variable.
Our conclusions do not change very much when we control for a country's risk rating and its openness as measured by its imports and exports over GDP. As in previous studies we …nd that these latter two variables contain information about expected returns and betas in emerging markets, but including them in the regression does not have a big e¤ect on the relevance of the segmentation variable.
Finally, we look at the e¤ects of integration on volatility. We use a GARCH speci…cation for the idiosyncratic variance of a market to analyze the e¤ect of segmentation on volatility. In contrast to the clear e¤ects on the costs of capital, we do not …nd systematic e¤ects of integration on the volatility of emerging markets returns. Although in many markets the volalitility is signi…cantly a¤ected by the level of segmentation, the pattern is not the same in each country and a decrease in segmentation can lead to either lower or higher volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model for the e¤ects of trading restrictions on expected returns. Section 3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents regression results for the direct e¤ect of market segmentation on expected returns. Section 5 presents empirical results allowing for time variation in country betas, Section 6 analyzes the volatility in the emerging markets, and Section 7 tests whether our results are robust by including control variables in the analysis. The …nal section contains some concluding remarks.
Expected returns and market integration
The standard International CAPM (Adler and Dumas, 1983) assumes that markets are completely integrated: there are no investment barriers between countries and all agents can freely invest in all countries. In such a setting, the expected country returns depend on the covariance of those returns with the world market portfolio and possibly with currency deposits. If on the other hand a market is completely segmented, standard asset pricing models imply that the expected country return is proportional to the local return variance. For certain countries, like the emerging markets, foreign investors may not be able to freely trade all assets, and part of the assets must be held by local investors. In that case markets are partially segmented: some assets can be traded freely, which we refer to as the investable assets, whereas other assets can only be held by domestic agents, which we refer to as the non-investable assets. In equilibrium, therefore, the non-investible assets have to be held by the domestic investors only. In such a case the portfolio of investable assets may serve as a hedge for the non-investable assets, and therefore the holdings of non-investable assets may enter the pricing equation for the investable assets (see, e.g., Errunza and Losq, 1985) .
Suppose there are K investable assets available, one for each market, with excess dollar returns given by the vector r I t+1 , the ith element of which is r I i;t+1 . The excess dollar returns on the noninvestable assets are denoted by the vector r X t+1 , the ith element of which will be denoted by r X i;t+1 . For simplicity assume that there is only one (representative) mean-variance investor per country, with wealth equal to Y i t . Expected returns on the investable indices are given by the vector ¹ I , whereas the expected returns for the noninvestables are given by ¹ X . For a mean-variance investor in emerging market j, who can also invest in his own country's noninvestable assets, the …rst order conditions arȩ
where¸j is the inverse of the risk aversion of representative investor j. The vector w j X takes the very speci…c form w j X = ³ 0 0 ¢ ¢ ¢ w j X;j ¢ ¢ ¢ 0´0 because only the local investor in country j can invest in that country's noninvestable assets. An investor that lives in a country where all assets are investable, can only invest in r I t+1 . We refer to such an investor as the world 6 investor, whose …rst order conditions are given by
Expected returns on investable assets
It is shown in the appendix that aggregating over all agents (countries), the risk premium on the investable assets is
where°m is the global aggregated risk aversion, r w t+1 is the return on the world market portfolio of investable assets, and q m j;t is the nontraded asset position in country j as a fraction of total invested wealth:
The …rst term in Equation (3) is familiar from the standard World CAPM; the second term is a discount on the risk premium if the asset provides a hedge against the risk of the non-investable asset returns. Since this relation must also hold for the expected return on the world market portfolio, we obtain a familiar beta-form of the model: 
where for notational convenience we leave out the time subscripts for the coe¢cients¯i and µ ij . This model is a natural generalization of the World CAPM where the additional terms are now the fractions of the nontraded assets in all countries in terms of total assets in the world. The presence of these terms cause additional risk premia because of the hedging demand by domestic agents for their position in the non-investable assets. Notice from equation (3) that, making some simplifying assumptions, we get that the expected return on local assets is a weighted average of the covariance with the world portfolio and the local variance as in Bekaert and Harvey (1995) , with time-varying weights proportional to q m i;t . Speci…cally, to obtain the model used by Bekaert and Harvey (1995) , we need that the local investable assets r , and that µ ij = 0, i.e., there may be no cross segmentation e¤ects between countries. Essentially, using these assumptions, Bekaert and Harvey (1995) try to estimate the level of integration that we try to measure directly with the segmentation variable q m i;t . The parameters of the segmentation variables, µ ij , depend on the covariance of the local, non-investable return with all the investable returns, corrected for their covariance with the world market return. This covariance will be big for assets from the same market j or from related markets, implying that we can expect µ ij to be nonzero for domestic assets and for assets from countries in the same region as market j, where the economic links may be strong
1 . An important implication of the model in (5) is therefore that additional risk premia relative to a standard International CAPM may arise for two reasons: one, because that country itself may be segmented; two, because economically related countries are segmented, which induces a hedging demand for the neighboring countries' assets. This is an important feature of the model that has not received attention in the literature so far. In our empirical analysis we will explicitly distinghuish between the local e¤ects and the cross-country e¤ects of segmentation on expected returns.
Expected returns on the noninvestable assets
For the noninvestable assets we can obtain a similar pricing relation, as shown in the appendix:
where
1 Notice that the model does not exclude the possibility that µ ij is negative. However, since r X j;t+1 are the noninvestable assets from country j which cannot be held by foreign investors, the covariance with the world index Cov £ r w t+1 ; r X j;t+1 ¤ will typically be dominated by the covariance with the domestic investable assets, Cov £ r i;t+1 ; r X j;t+1
¤ .
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and
The segmentation variable is now a local variable, i.e., it re ‡ects the market value of the noninvestable assets in country j as a fraction of total investable wealth in that country rather than as a fraction of total investable wealth of the world. Notice that if the size of the segmented market relative to the rest of the world does not change too much over time, q m j;t is proportional to q j t . We will use this as a working assumption in the empirical analysis.
The second di¤erence with the investable assets is that the expected return of the noninvestable assets does not depend on the covariance with the world portfolio, but on all the individual covariances of the noninvestables of country j with all the investable markets in the world: the coe¢cients B j result from regressing the noninvestable asset returns r X j;t+1 on all the investable assets r I t+1 rather than on the world portfolio. The coe¢cient ' j likewise depends on the residual " t+1 of this regression. Using
we can write, following equation (8b) and substituting
which shows the familiar result that in segmented markets the local variance is priced, where the local risk aversion determines the market price of risk. Hence, in case markets are segmented, the expected returns of both the investable and the noninvestable assets in these markets are a¤ected by the level of segmentation in that market. Unlike the investable assets, the expected returns on the noninvestable assets is a¤ected by the local segmentation variable only, and not by the level of segmentation in other countries.
Global Indices
The model presented above suggests that both the investable and the noninvestable assets in a country are a¤ected by the level of segmentation in a market. Equation (5) shows that the expected returns on the investable assets are determined by their covariance with the world market portfolio and by all relevant segmentation variables. On the other hand, according to Equation (7), the expected returns on the noninvestable assets are determined by the individual covariances of those assets with all other countries and by the local level of segmentation. If we make the simplifying assumption that the returns on the investable assets are spanned by the world market portfolio returns, then Equation (7) simpli…es to
Therefore, the expected returns on the noninvestable assets are also determined by the covariance with the world market portfolio and by the local segmentation variable. The di¤erence between the noninvestable and the investable assets is that the expected returns on the latter are also a¤ected by the level of segmentation in other countries because of cross hedging e¤ects. In the empirical analysis below we will use the emerging market indices of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IFC provides indices for the investable assets in a country, the Investable indices, and for all assets in a country, the Global indices. Since for each country, the IFC Global indices, r 
Substituting from (5) and (7) this gives:
(10) If the investable and noninvestable assets have similar risk characteristics, then we can assume that¯X i ¡¯I i ¼ 0. In the empirical analysis we can therefore measure the e¤ect of the segmentation variable on the noninvestable assets by using q 2 has a signi…cant e¤ect on the IFC Global index returns.
Data

Emerging market returns
Our dataset consists of monthly US Dollar-based observations on 30 emerging markets, that are grouped into four regions: Latin America (7), Asia & the Far East (10), Europe (7), and the Mideast & Africa (6). In addition to the individual countries, we also use aggregate data for each of the four regions, and for a composite index of all emerging markets together. Depending on the country, the sample period is from January 1988 or later until May 2000. All emerging markets data are from the Emerging Markets DataBase of the International Finance Corporation. In addition, the MSCI World index is used as a proxy for the world market index. These data are obtained from Datastream. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the IFC Investable indices for the emerging markets. The …rst two columns show the annualized means and standard deviations of the monthly dollar returns. These statistics illustrate some well known properties of emerging market returns. Many emerging markets have experienced high average returns, but at the same time most of these markets have been very volatile, as can be seen from the standard deviations of the returns. Also, there is a lot of cross-sectional variation in the returns, as can be seen from the mean returns which vary between -35.1% for Slovakia and 50.0% for Argentina. Table 2 shows the betas of the emerging markets with respect to the world market index, along with the associated t-statistics. The …rst two columns show these statistics for the IFC Investable indices. Columns 5 and 6 likewise present the statistics for the Global indices. The estimates for these two sets of indices are very similar. Most emerging markets have unconditional systematic risk estimates that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and often even signi…cantly bigger than one.
Segmentation variables
The main focus of this paper is the e¤ect of market segmentation on expected returns. The third and fourth column of Table 1 give some insight into the relevance of investment barriers for the di¤erent emerging markets. These columns present the means and standard deviations of our segmentation variable, which is based on the market value of the investable and noninvestable assets in each country. More precisely, let V j t represent the value of the assets in country j at time t which can be held by both domestic and foreign investors without restrictions. These are the investable assets and are measured by the total market capitalization of the IFC Investable Index for country j. Similarly, let Q j t represent the value of the assets in country j at time t that can only be held by domestic investors. The total invested wealth in country j is then given by Y j t = V j t + Q j t . These are the noninvestable assets, and are measured by the di¤erence in the total market capitalization of the IFC Global Index and the IFC Investable Index for country j. Our segmentation variable for country j is then de…ned as
Notice that the variables Q j t and V j t do not capture all the noninvestable and investable assets in a country, but only the assets that are included in the IFC indices. Also note that the model in Section 2 implies that this is the appropriate integration variable for the noninvestable assets, whereas for the investable assets, this is the ratio of Q j t over P j Y j t , i.e., the amount of noninvestable assets in country j divided by the global aggregate wealth. As noted in Section 2, as long as the weight of country j in the world portfolio is not too variable, these two segmentation variables will be proportional to each other, which we will use as a working assumption throughout the paper. Notice that this also means that we estimate µ ij up to a constant of proportionality. An additional advantage of the variable q j t is that it is always in the range [0; 1] and that it has an easy interpretation: q j t simply re ‡ects the percentage of assets in country j that cannot be traded by foreign investors.
As the third column of Table 1 shows, there is quite some variation between the average segmentation of the countries. Some markets, like Poland and South Africa, show hardly any segmentation: for those markets, on average more than 98 percent of the assets could be traded freely by both domestic and foreign investors. On the other hand, for countries like Chile, China, India, and Korea, on average more than 50 percent of the assets were not available for foreign investors, implying a high level of segmentation. The standard deviations of the segmentation variable show that many countries also have a signi…cant amount of variation in the level of segmentation over time. This con…rms the …ndings of Bekaert and Harvey (1995) that the level of integration varies over time.
Several studies report liberalization dates for emerging markets, i.e., dates where a country's government allows foreign investors to purchase shares in that country's stock market (Henry, 2000 , Bekaert and Harvey, 2000 , and Kim and Singal, 2000 . As Henry (2000 , Table II ) shows, there is no general agreement on the o¢cial liberalization date. Figures 1 through 6 show how our segmentation variable relates to the o¢cial liberalization dates (as reported by these di¤erent authors in Henry, 2000) for a number of emerging markets. We only show graphs for those markets where liberalization dates are reported after the start of our dataseries, which leaves six countries. For three of the six countries in Figures 1-6 , the o¢cial liberalization dates are also obvious in our segmentation variable: For Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, at least one of the reported dates coincides with a sharp decrease in the segmentation variable q j t . Although in those cases the liberalization clearly has an important e¤ect on our segmentation variable, it is also obvious from the graphs that there is a lot of variation in q j t that is not covered by the reported liberalization dates. Also, there are many liberalization dates reported in Henry (2000) that are not accompanied by a signi…cant change in q j t . Thus, although an o¢cial liberalization can obviously cause a change in the level of segmentation, these two variables are clearly not equivalent. Since our segmentation variable captures much more than o¢cial liberalizations only, we may be able to explain more of the variation in expected returns than Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . The main point of this analysis is that liberalization is a gradual process, not a one-shot event. Our segementation measure allows for a simple and theoretically justi…ed way to assess the e¤ect of liberalizations on expected returns.
Direct e¤ects from segmentation on expected returns
The main question in this paper is whether the variability in q j t translates into time varying expected returns, as suggested by the model in Section 2. We …rst answer this question for the IFC Investable indices. The starting point of the analysis is Equation (5), which relates the expected returns on the investable assets to the level of segmentation in the di¤erent countries. Assuming that all variances and covariances in (5) are constant over time, it is not hard to show that OLS estimation of the regression
yields consistent estimates of the coe¢cients¯i and µ ij .
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Segmentation e¤ects from the own market on the investable indices
We start out with a speci…cation where only q i t , i.e., the country's own integration variable, is included. Thus, here we estimate the regression
The …rst four columns of Table 2 provide estimates of¯i and µ i along with the associated t-values 2 where r i;t+1 is the return on the Investable index of market i. The estimates show that for many markets the returns are signi…cantly a¤ected by the level of integration. Especially for the Latin American markets, there are strong e¤ects and the estimated coe¢cients b µ i are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in …ve out of seven countries. Notice that the estimated e¤ects are not only statistically signi…cant, but also economically. For example, the estimated b µ i of 0.61 for Argentina implies that a one percentage point decrease in the level of segmentation as measured by q j t , would yield a decrease in the expected return of 0.61 percent, given the estimated b i . For Asia and the Far East and for the European emerging markets, there is hardly any evidence of an e¤ect of a country's level of segmentation on the expected returns in that same country.
When looking at the regional indices, there is evidence in favor of an e¤ect of segmentation on expected returns at a regional level. These regional e¤ects are in some contrast to the results for the individual countries, however. For Latin America and for the Mideast and Africa, the estimated µ i is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, whereas for Asia and the Far East it is.
Panel F of Table 2 provides panel data estimates of the regression in (13). In the panel data regressions we impose that µ i = µ for all countries i within a certain region j. For instance, for Latin America the panel data estimation implies that µ i = 0:067 for all the Latin American countries. Although the assumption that µ i is the same for each country, the panel data estimate can be interpreted as a weighted average of the individual µ i 's in panels A through E of Table 2 , and the panel data estimates may be more e¢cient than the individual country estimates.
The panel data estimates roughly con…rm the …ndings for the individual countries: the direct e¤ects of a country's own level segmentation are par-ticularly strong for Latin America and for the Mideast and Africa, as well as for the four regions. Notice that the panel data estimates in the line 'All regions' assumes that µ i = 0:072 for all four regional indices. This estimate is also very similar to the estimate of µ i for the Composite index in Panel E, which is 0.069, which can be interpreted as a value weighted average of the individual µ i 's. These numbers imply that a decrease in the segmentation variable with one percent leads to a decrease in expected return of about seven basis points per month.
The results for the countries within each region are summarized in Table  3 , Panel A. The …rst column provides the p-values associated with a Wald test-statistic for the hypothesis that µ i = 0 in (13) for all countries within a region. These tests con…rm the …nding that the level of segmentation is important for expected returns in Latin America and in the Mideast and Africa, but we do not …nd such evidence for Asia and the Far East. The e¤ects for the European countries are jointly signi…cant on a ten percent level, but not on the …ve percent level. For the four regions, the joint hypothesis of no segmentation e¤ects is also rejected at the ten percent level, but not at the …ve percent level. The integration e¤ect is again signi…cant for the Composite index for all emerging markets. These results are all economically very signi…cant.
In summary, these …rst results clearly indicate that the level of integration of an emerging market can have signi…cant e¤ects on the expected returns in that market.
Segmentation e¤ects on the global indices
The model in Section 2 suggests that both the investable and the noninvestable assets in a country are a¤ected by the level of segmentation in a market. Assuming that¯X i ¡¯I i ¼ 0, the analysis in Section 2.3 shows that we can use the Global indices to analyze the e¤ects of segmentation on the noninvestable assets beyond the e¤ect on the investable assets in a country. In particular, from (10) we can use the estimate of ' i in the regression
to measure the e¤ect of q i t on the expected returns on the noninvestable assets in country i.
The last two columns of Table 2 show the estimates of ' i for each country and region along with the associated t-values. Although there are some e¤ects of the level of segmentation on the noninvestable assets, these are much weaker than the ones we found for the investable assets. Both the panel data estimations in Panel F of Table 2 and the joint tests in Panel B of Table 3 show that the results are strongest for the Mideast and Africa. Apart from that we only …nd some marginal signi…cant results for the four regions based on the panel data estimates and for Asia and the Far East based on the joint tests in Table 3 .
Regional segmentation e¤ects
Apart from a country's own level of segmentation, the model in Section 2 implies that there may also be cross e¤ects on the investable assets from the level of segmentation of related markets, as can be seen from the de…nition of µ ij in (6). To the extent that markets A and B are correlated, segmentation in market A may have an e¤ect on the investable expected returns in market B as well, because investable assets in market B can serve as a (partial) substitute for the noninvestable assets in market A.
To see whether such cross e¤ects are important, we use an additional integration variable q jni t for each country i in a given region j such as Latin America and estimate the following regression for each country i in that region: r
The segmentation variable q jni t is de…ned as:
for each country in region j. We then test the null-hypotheses that µ i;own = 0 and µ i;reg = 0, for i = 1; 2; ::; K j , for each region, where K j is the number of countries in region j. The second and third column of Panel A of Table 3 shows the p-values associated with the Wald test-statistics for these hypotheses.
These p-values suggest that it is important to consider the regional e¤ects beyond individual country e¤ects. Especially for Asia and the Far East, where we did not …nd an e¤ect from the country's own level of segmentation using the results in the …rst column, the p-value in the last column shows the importance of the region. Moreover, when accounting for the regional level of segmentation, the country's own level of segmentation becomes important as well. The reverse seems to be true for Europe and for the Mideast and Africa, where the segmentation level of the country itself is important, but the regional segmentation level is not. The average correlations between the countries in each region as reported in the last column of Panel E of Table 1 somewhat con…rm this …nding: whereas the average correlation between the countries in Asia and the Far East is 0.33, for the countries in the Mideast and Africa it is only 0.12.
3 . Panel B shows similar results based on the global indices, where we also include (q i t ) 2 again to account for the e¤ect of the local segmentation on the noninvestable assets. In case of Latin America and Europe, the e¤ect of the regional segmentation level is now even more pronounced, further illustrating the importance of segmentation in related countries. Summarizing, we …nd that the level of integration is important in explaining expected returns in emerging markets. For Latin America, both the country's own level of integration as well as cross e¤ects from countries in the same region are important. In Asia and the Far East, the regional e¤ects appear to be more important than the individual country e¤ects, whereas in the European emerging markets and the markets in the Mideast and Africa, the level of integration of the country itself is the most important. The e¤ects of a country's own segmentation on its noninvestable assets, as they show up in the IFC Global indices, appear to be weaker. Taken together, these …rst results already provide strong evidence for the model in Section 2, showing that the expected returns on a country's assets are a¤ected both by its own level of segmentation as well as teh segmentation in related (neighbouring) countries.
Time-varying covariances
The analysis so far assumed that all covariances in the model in (5) and (7) are constant over time. This assumption may be problematic however, since as markets open up and become more integrated, their beta is expected to change as well. This is also shown in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), who …nd an increase in the beta with the world portfolio of 0.12 following emerging markets liberalizations. Therefore, in this section we explicitly allow for time variation in beta as a result of changes in the level of segmentation. Assuming that beta is linear in the segmentation variable, the model for the investable assets becomes
where z t = q i t if we limit ourselves to the local segmentation variable and z t = ³ q i t q jni t´0 if we consider both the local segmentation level and the regional segmentation level. Thus, we estimate the following regression model:
We refer to the parameters as¯i =¯i ;own and µ i = µ i;own , and¯i = ³¯i ;own¯i;reg´0 and µ i = ³ µ i;own µ i;reg´0 respectively.
Local segmentation e¤ects with time-varying betas
We start by estimating (15) with the country's own segmentation variable as a dependent variable, i.e., z t = q i t for country i. Table 4 reports the estimates for¯0 i ,¯i ;own , and µ i;own along with their t-values. The interesting coe¢cient is now¯i ;own . The estimated coe¢cients b i;own and their t-values clearly indicate time-variation for a number of countries. The estimates are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for nine countries. Also, for the majority of the countries b i;own has the expected negative sign: as the level of segmentation decreases, markets become more integrated and their beta relative to the world increases. Allowing for time-varying betas makes the direct e¤ects of segmentation on expected returns as measured by µ i;own somewhat stronger, as follows from the …fth and sixth column of Table 4 . The …ndings here are comparable to the ones in Table 2 , but the t-values are in general higher in Table 4 .
Panel E of Table 5 gives an estimate of the e¤ect of market segmentation on the beta's and expected returns for the four regions and for all emerging markets together as represented in the Composite index. For the composite index we …nd an estimate of¯o wn of -1.55. This number means that if markets would change from completely segmented to not segmented (q The change in beta due to a change in the segmentation variable is accompanied by a direct e¤ect of market segmentation on the expected return as measured by µ i;own . Allowing for time-variation in beta, the direct effect of market segmentation is now signi…cant for Latin America, Asia and the Far East, as well as for the composite index for all emerging markets. Also, except for Europe,¯i ;own and µ i;own are always of the opposite sign, implying that a decrease in segmentation has two opposite e¤ects on expected returns: the direct e¤ect is negative, but the increase in beta has a positive e¤ect. For the composite index, the estimate of¯o wn and µ own , combined with an annual change in q Comp t of 5.5 percentage points and an average return on the world portfolio of 1.04 percent per month (the sample average), we …nd that the total e¤ect of the decrease in market segmentation is 0:085 £ 0:0104 ¡ 0:085 £ 0:055 = ¡0:0038. Thus, the annual decrease in expected returns on the composite emerging market index due to the average annual decrease in market segmentation is estimated to be 38 basis points per month or about 4.5 percent per year.
Similarly, the last two columns of Table 4 present estimates of the annual decrease in expected returns due to the average annual change in segmentation for all the emerging markets in our dataset, along with the standard errors of the estimates, where it is assumed that the expected return on the world market portfolio is 1.04% per month, or about 12.5% per year. Although for most markets these estimates are reasonable, they can be very big for some individual countries like Israel. However, the standard errors also show that the estimates for the individual countries are often very imprecise. For the composite index, we see that the estimate of 4.5% is fairly precise, with a standard error of 1.5%. For Latin America and for Asia and the Far East we …nd similar results as for the Composite index, but for Europe and the Mideast and Africa the estimates are less than 1.5 standard errors away from zero and here the estimates do not even have the expected sign.
Panel F of Table 4 shows again panel data estimates of the regression in (15), assuming that¯i ;own =¯o wn and µ i;own = µ own for all countries within a certain region. These estimates show that for every region except Europe we …nd that at least one of the two e¤ects (direct and indirect) of the own segmentation level is signi…cant. The joint tests for the individual countries in a region as presented Table 5 are even stronger in this respect. Table  5 presents tests for the e¤ects of market segmentation on the betas as well as the direct e¤ects, jointly for all countries in a certain region. The table presents p-values associated with Wald test-statistics for the hypothesis that i;own = 0 and for the hypothesis that µ i;own = 0, for all countries within a region, as well as for all four regions and for the Composite index. The …rst two columns of Panel A test for the e¤ect of a country's or region's own segmentation level. Except for the Mideast and Africa we can always reject the hypothesis of a constant beta. Also, controlling for the time-variation in beta, we …nd strong evidence of a direct e¤ect of the own segmentation level for all regions except Asia and the Far East. Both the direct e¤ect and the e¤ect on beta are also apparent for the regional indices and for the Composite index.
Panel F of Table 4 and Panel B of 
Especially the panel data regressions in Table 4 , which assume that¯i ;own =¯o wn , µ i;own = µ own and ' ;i = ' for all markets within a region, show strong e¤ects on the noninvestable assets as well now. It is only for Europe that ' i is indistinguishable from zero. The joint tests as reported in Table 5 show somewhat weaker, although here as well the results are certainly stronger than the ones that follow from Table 3. Notice that the regression in (16) is actually more in line with the model in Section 2.3 if we do not assume that¯I i =¯X i .
Regional segmentation e¤ects with time-varying betas
>From the model in Section 2 and the preliminary analysis in Section 4, we have seen that expected returns depend both on the local level of segmentation in a market, as well as the level of segmentation in the region (i.e., in related countries). Therefore, we should also allow for regional e¤ects with time-varying betas. Table 5 also reports results for the regressions in (15) and (16) . To save space, we focus on the coe¢cients i;reg , µ i;reg and ' i and do not report test results for¯i ;own and µ i;own .
For the IFC Investable indices, the last two columns of Panel A of Table  5 look at the e¤ect of the regional segmentation variables on the country returns and the country betas and on the e¤ect of the global segmentation variable on the returns and betas of the regional indices. Again we …nd strong segmentation e¤ects, both direct and via the betas. An important result that follows from Table 5 is that in all cases we …nd regional segmentation e¤ects beyond local segmentation e¤ects. The regional e¤ect may operate via the direct e¤ect, µ i;own , the indirect e¤ect,¯i ;reg , or both, as is the case in Latin America. For Asia and the Far East the regional e¤ect appears to operate through the direct e¤ect (µ i;own ) and not through the e¤ect on the betas. The opposite appears to be the case for the European emerging markets and for the Mideast and Africa. Interestingly, we also …nd that the four regions are a¤ected by a regional segmentation e¤ect, which in this case is a global level of segmentation.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the similar tests for the IFC Global indices, but now based on the regression in (16). Except for the four regions, these tests basically con…rm the ones in Panel A and in addition document again a segmentation e¤ect on the noninvestable assets (via ' i ) for Latin America and the Mideast and Africa.
The results reported in this section show our main conclusion: as suggested by the simple model in Section 2, we …nd strong evidence that expected returns in emerging markets are a¤ected by the segmentation both of the own market and of related markets. Both e¤ects can operate via two channels: the segmentation variable q j t can decrease expected returns via the direct e¤ect µ ij or it can increase expected returns via the indirect on the beta of the country,¯i ;reg . A panel data regression pooling all 30 emerging markets in our dataset, assuming that¯i ;own =¯o wn ,¯i ;reg =¯r eg , µ i;own = µ own , and µ i;reg = µ reg , yields where we put t-values in brackets. This panel data regression allows us to get an idea of the relative importance of the local and regional e¤ects for 21 the expected returns. Over the sample period, we …nd that the average decrease in the country's own level of segmentation q i t is 4.2 percent per annum, whereas the average decrease in the regional level of segmentation q jni t is 5.1 percent per annum. Assuming again that the expected return on the world market portfolio is about 12.5 percent per annum and combining these numbers with the panel data estimates above, this implies that on average the decrease in the countries' own level of segmentation leads to a decrease in expected return of 2.3 percent per annum, whereas the decrease in the regional segmentation level accounts for another 1.4 percent per annum, yielding a total decrease in expected returns of about 3.7 percent per annum. From these numbers, the country's own segmentation accounts for about 63 percent of the decrease in expected returns, whereas the regional e¤ects account for approximately 37 percent of the total decrease. This shows that the regional segmentation e¤ect is also economically very signi…cant.
Time-varying volatility
The above analysis showed strong direct and indirect e¤ects from segmentation on the expected returns of a country. The indirect e¤ects, operating via the beta of a country w.r.t. the world market portfolio, indicate that as a market becomes more integrated with the rest of the world, its systematic risk increases. Beakert and Harvey (2001) and Bae and Chan (2001) have similar results, and Bae and Chan also …nd that investable stocks have a higher volatility than noninvestable stocks. On the other hand, previous studies (e.g. Bekaert and Harvey (1997)) suggest that as markets liberalize, equity market volatility decreases. Therefore, we may expect that there is also a relation between the level of segmentation and local market volatility. In order to investigate this issue we propose to use a GARCH model for the idiosyncratic volatility in (15) and use the segmentation variable q j t as an exogenous variable in the GARCH model. Speci…cally, we estimate the following model:
If segmentation indeed leads to higher volatility, we expect ± i to be positive. Table 6 shows the estimation results for the model in (17) where we use both the local (j = i) and the regional segmentation variables q j t , and we in-vestigate the e¤ect of these variables on both the Investable and the Global IFC indices for the countries in our dataset. To limit the number of variables in the GARCH estimation, we use for the regional segmentation variable q j t the level of segmentation of the entire region, including the country itself, and do not separate between q i t and q jni t . To save space we only report the estimates of ± i along with the associated p-values for the hypothesis that ± i = 0.
4;5 The …rst four columns of Table 6 show the results for the IFC Investable indices. Here we see that for nine out of 30 individual countries, there is a signi…cant e¤ect of the local segmentation variable on idiosyncratic volatility, at least at the ten percent level. However, the estimated coe¢cient can be both positive or negative, i.e., an increase in market integration can lead to both a decrease or an increase in the idiosyncratic risk of a country's stock market. The e¤ects of the regional segmentation variables are somewhat similar: there are signi…cant e¤ects for six individual countries, and the estimated coe¢cients are often negative, at least in the cases where they are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. For the Investable indices for the regions we do not …nd any signi…cant results.
The last four columns of Table 6 present similar results for the IFC Global indices. Although the results for the individual countries and regions do not coincide for the Global and the Investable indices, the pattern is qualitatively the same. There are signi…cant e¤ects from the local (regional) segmentation variables on ten (eight) individual countries, and these e¤ects can be either positive or negative. For Europe and the Mideast and Africa, we now also …nd signi…cant e¤ects of the global segmentation variable on the regional indices.
Thus, the e¤ects of the level of segmentation on the idiosyncratic risk of the emerging markets are rather inconclusive. Although there are e¤ects from the level of segmentation on volatility, as witnessed both by the tests for the individual countries and the joint tests for the di¤erent regions, the sign of the e¤ect is not clear. An increase in the level of integration with the rest of the world may lead to either a decrease or an increase in the volatility of the market. Moreover, for a given country the e¤ect of the local level of integration can even be opposite to e¤ect of the regional level of integration, as is the case for instance for Sri Lanka. Thus, whereas we found clear evidence that more integrated markets lead to lower expected returns, such a conclusion cannot be reached for the volatility in emerging markets.
Control variables
The asset pricing model in Section 2 suggests that expected asset returns are related to a direct measure for the level of segmentation of a country's …nancial markets. However, from previous studies it is well known that expected returns in emerging markets are a¤ected by other variables as well. For instance, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1995) show that di¤erent country risk factors (political, economic, and …nancial) contain information about expected equity returns. Such variables are likely to re ‡ect relevant risk factors that are not captured by the beta of the country with respect to the world market portfolio. Next, besides our direct measure of …nancial segmentation, previous studies have also used other variables to measure integration or segmentation. For instance, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2001) use a country's market capitalization relative to its GDP and the size of the trade sector (exports plus imports) relative to GDP as measures for economic integration. Such variables can capture elements of segmentation or integration beyond our direct measure.
In this section we want to analyze whether our direct segmentation variable contains information about expected stock returns that is not captured by other risk or integration variables. Therefore, we repeat our previous tests by including in the regression two additional variables, labelled country risk (crisk t ) and openness (open t ). The country risk measure is the composite risk index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This measure is a simple function of the three base risk measures of the ICRG for political, economic, and …nancial risk, and has been analyzed in detail by Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1995) . The openness variable is the ratio of export and import over GDP, which is also used as a control variable by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) . As stated, these two measures are supposed to capture a country's risk and level of integration respectively. For the four regions and for the Composite level, we create a weighted average of the country risk and openness variables respectively, where the weights are given by the country's market capitalization at the beginning of each month. Table 7 shows some information as to how these variables are related to our (direct) segmentation variable, q t . The …rst two columns of Table  7 then show the average absolute correlations of the two variables with our segmentation variables in a region or for all emerging markets together. Both variables have a fairly high correlation with the level of segmentation q t for the individual countries and for the four regions. It is only for the Composite level itself that the correlations are relatively low. Especially the openness variable has a rather high average correlation with our segmentation variable, which is to be expected, since both try to measure a level of integration in a country. Finally, the last column shows the R 2 of a regression of the segmentation variable q t on crisk t and open t .
We proceed our analysis with the basic model analyzed in Section 5, using the following regression: (18) where, as before, z t = q Table 8 shows test results for the IFC Investable indices in di¤erent regions and can be compared with Panel A of Table 5 . The numbers in the table are p-values associated with a Wald-test for the hypotheses that¯i j = 0 and µ ij = 0 for all markets in a region and for the hypothesis that°1 i =°2 i = 0 for all markets in a region.
The results in Panel A of Table 8 are roughly similar to the ones in Table  5 . For the own level of segmentation we …nd again that it always has a signi…cant e¤ect, either directly, indirectly, or both. The main di¤erence is that the direct e¤ect for Asia and the Far East becomes stronger, wherease for the four regions it becomes weaker. It is interesting to note that the control variables do have explanatory power as well, as follows from the third column of Panel A, implying that these variables contain information about expected returns that is not captured by our segmentation variable. For the regional segmentation variable the results in the last columns of Panel A are somewhat weaker than the ones in Table 5 , but the picture that emerges is very similar again: the regional segmentation variable has a signi…cant e¤ect beyond the local segmentation variable and the control variables in all cases, although for Latin America this is only so at the ten percent signi…cance level. To save space, we only report results for the coe¢cients¯i ;reg and µ i;reg in the second half of Panel A. Notice that the control variables are country speci…c, thereby potentially biasing the results somewhat against regional e¤ects. Nevertheless, the results in Panel A of Table 8 do con…rm our earlier …ndings. Again we see that the control variables often have explanatory power beyond our segmentation variables as well.
Panel B provides the panel data estimates of the regression in (18) for the parameters of interest. Again, these results con…rm our earlier …ndings: both local and regional segmentation clearly a¤ect the expected returns in almost all markets and most coe¢cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero also have the expected sign.
In summary we …nd that the country's risk rating and its openness certainly contain information about expected returns that is not captured by our segmentation variable. But the level of segmentation has signi…cant direct and indirect e¤ects on returns in emerging markets and these e¤ects are not very di¤erent whether we control for these additional variables or not.
Summary and conclusions
We use a simple model in which market integration or segmentation is a time-varying variable which has an e¤ect on expected returns apart from systematic risk. Using a set of 30 emerging markets we …nd strong evidence for the e¤ects of the level of segmentation on the expected returns in emerging markets. Integration with the world market leads to lower expected returns and hence lower costs of capital. Expected returns in emerging markets are a¤ected by the level of segmentation in the country itself, but also by the level of segmentation in other countries in the same region. Likewise, the expected returns in the four regions are a¤ected by the level of segmentation in the region itself, but also by the global level of segmentation as measured by the Composite index for the emerging markets. Whereas the emerging markets in Europe and in the Mideast and Africa are mostly a¤ected by the level of segmentation of the country itself, we …nd that in Asia and the Far East the regional segmentation level is more important. For the Latin American countries both variables are important.
We also allow for time-variation in the country's and region's betas relative to the world. Allowing for betas that are linear in the segmentation variables shows even stronger segmentation e¤ects on expected returns. The direct e¤ect of segmentation and the e¤ect on beta usually have the opposite sign: whereas the direct e¤ect of a decrease in segmentation leads to lower expected returns, it is accompanied by an increase in beta, implying higher expected returns. As for the direct e¤ects, the beta can be a¤ected by the segmentation level of the country itself or of the regional segmentation level. For every region both the country's own segmentation level as well as the regional segmentation level are important, albeit for di¤erent regions the e¤ects operate mainly via the beta or via the direct e¤ect. All these conclusions are robust to controls for the country risk rating and openness as measured by imports and exports over GDP.
As the model predicts, for the noninvestable indices we …nd that the local level of segmentation or integration is more important than the regional level. This is a natural …nding, since the noninvestable assets in a country cannot serve as a hedge for foreign investors for the noninvestable assets in other countries. Using panel data regressions, we estimate that on average the local level of segmentation and the regional level of segmentation together induce a decrease in the expected return of 3.6 percent per year for the 30 emerging markets in our sample. We …nd that on average approximately 63 percent of this decrease is due to the local level of segmentation and 37 percent to the regional level of segmentation.
Finally, although our model only relates to expected returns, we also analyze the relation between segmentation and volatility in emerging markets. Here we do not …nd any systematic relation: although we do …nd that the level of segmentation is often signi…cantly related to volatility, our GARCHspeci…cation shows that a decrease in segmentation can lead to either an increase or decrease in idiosyncratic risk in an emerging market. ² Stulz, René, 1999, International portfolio ‡ows and security markets, Working Paper, Dice Center for Financial Economics, Ohio State University.
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A Appendix: Derivation of the model As in Section 2, let there be K countries with excess returns on the investable indices r I t+1 , where some countries, the emerging markets, also have noninvestable indices which cannot be traded by foreign investors. The returns on the non-investable indices are summarized in the vector of excess dollar returns r X t+1 A world investor is restricted to investing in the K investable indices, implying that his …rst order conditions look likȩ
with¸j = 1=°j, i.e., the inverse of the local risk aversion. Market segmentation is modelled by limiting the menu of available assets for some investors, while every investor chooses the optimal portfolio from the available assets. For an emerging market investor, who can also invest in his own market j, the …rst order conditions arȩ
The …rst order conditions for the world investor can also be written aş
which has the advantage that for every investor we have matrices with the same dimensions. The next step is to aggregate over all investors, who have relative wealth 
for the vector of investable indices anḑ
for each of the noninvestable indices.
A.1 Expected return-beta relation for the investable indices
For the investable indices, we get
Premultiplying with w 0 gives
°m
which, after substituing in the previous relation gives 
A.2 Expected return-beta relation for the noninvestable indices
For the expected returns on the noninvestable index in a country, we can start from (19). The …rst order conditions for the tradable assets give us
which after substitution in the …rst order conditions for the nontraded assets in market j giveş
from which
Thus, the B j are the slope coe¢cients from a regression of r X j;t+1 on all the investable assets, and ' j depends on the variance of the residuals from the same regression and the local risk aversion. Thus, in the regression r X j;t+1 = a j + B j r I t+1 + " t+1 ;
we should have that ' j =°j¾ 2 " . Also notice that q j t is de…ned in terms of local wealth, not in terms of global wealth as q m t . 
for the global indices. In the tests for the own segmentation z t = q i t , the segmentation level of the market itself, whereas in the tests for regional segmentation 
Here again it is assumed that ' i = ' (and µ i = µ) for all countries within a region. 
for the investable indices and
for the global indices. In the tests for the own segmentation z t = q i t , the segmentation level of the market itself, whereas in the tests for regional segmentation In the tests for the own segmentation z t = q 
